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THE INTERPRETABLE CONSTITUTION. By William F. Ha"is IL Bal-
timore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1993. Pp. xv, 225. $38.50. 
"[W]e must never forget, that it is a constitution we are 
expounding." 1 
Professor William F. Harris 112 attempts to give meaning to John 
Marshall's well-known phrase in his recent book, The Interpretable 
Constitution. Harris ambitiously attempts to derive a theory of consti-
tutional interpretation from first principles by identifying what is 
unique about the genre of a constitution in general and about the 
American Constitution in particular. 
The Interpretable Constitution is not a list of "wrong" Supreme 
Court decisions; nor is it merely a recipe for interpreting the Constitu-
tion. In Harris's own words, "the purpose of the Interpretable Consti-
tution is not to produce categorically correct answers but to 
substantiate ways of interpreting that do not undermine the nature of 
the enterprise and whose conscientious use will illuminate the charac-
ter of its political project" (p. 162 n.28). To that end, Harris develops 
a complex, multilayered, and language-based view of the constitu-
tional project. In describing that project, Harris clfilms that 
[i]n this crucially self-referential enterprise, a purposefully composed 
text creates its own normative author. It constructs the popular sover-
eign it needs to be authoritative, ·and it nurtures the political life of a 
People whose citizenship provides it with the only reality it can have or 
need .... This People and these Citizens are not merely the analytical 
necessities for explaining the validity of the Constitution. Their persis-
tent commitments and practices give the project its three-dimensionality 
as a meaningful world. 3 
Harris's basic premise is that ·constitutional interpretation must focus 
on the bond between language and politics that we usually take for 
granted (p. 84), and, accordingly, his theory is deeply intertwined with 
language. 
Harris posits two distant but parallel political orders. The first is 
the level of the individual and the Constitution-as-a-document. On 
this level, an individual, or "natural" person, considers the truth and 
falsity of propositions by reasoning and communicates those judg-
ments through language. The analogous second order is the realm of 
the political collectivity and the constitution-as-a-polity - the instan-
1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 
2. Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania. 
3. P. xi; cf. JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION 101 (1990) ("Reading is .•. an 
ethical activity, a way of becoming someone in relation to another .•.. I am thus suggesting a 
way of reading a text as rhetorically constitutive: as an act of expression that reconstitutes its 
own resources of language and in doing so constitutes a community .•.. "). 
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tiation of the first order document in the political sphere. Here, the 
artificial person, akin to Hobbes's Leviathan, ponders justice by a pro-
cess of collective rationality that takes the form of civil law. To ex-
plain the relationship between the two levels, Harris constructs a 
political metaphor of writing, reading, explaining, and revising the 
Constitution and the constitution - the first- and second-order polit-
ical "texts."4 Each component of the metaphor comprises a separate 
chapter. 
In Chapter One, "Writing the Constitutional Polity," Harris be-
gins with the observation that politics and language are deeply con-
nected, both descriptively and normatively (p. 46). Politics is, and 
should be, carried out through language. Although that statement 
may be true of most, if not all, political systems, 5 word and polity are 
even more profoundly bound in the specifically American political ar-
rangement, in which a written document serves as the very foundation 
of the American polity. "To write a Constitution - that is, to write 
down the political form - is ... to trade on and ... to systematize the 
preexisting concordance of language and politics. This chapter ex-
plores Constitution-writing under such a conceptualization" (p. 47; 
emphasis omitted). 
Authoring a Constitution parallels the authoring of other genres. 
Harris speaks of literary narrative as marking off a "clean, well-lighted 
place" - to use Ernest Hemingway's metaphor - from the surround-
ing darkness and chaos, 6 much as a political narrative establishes an 
organized sphere from some sort of Hobbesian state of nature. In 
Genesis, God speaks, and order emerges from the chaos as light sepa-
rates from darkness.7 A group of people write a Constitution, which 
in tum grants them an identity and defines them as a Constitutional 
People, a People of the text. The American Constitution becomes a 
metaphor for the American constitution; the written document stands 
as a symbol of the reality of the polity. 
Harris argues that the "writtenness" of the Constitution is funda-
mental to the document's interpretability (p. 83). Basing the political 
4. This Notice follows Harris's style, capitalizing Constitution when referring to the first-
order political text - the document - and using lower-case constitution when referring to the 
second-order political text - the polity. 
5. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 100 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books 1968) 
(1651) ("[Without Speech, there would have been] neither Common-wealth, nor Society, nor 
Contract, nor Peace ..•. "); JOHN LoCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in Two TREA· 
TISES OF GOVERNMENT§ 77, at 318-19 (Peter Laslett ed., student ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1988) (1690) ("God ... put [man] under strong Obligations of Necessity, Convenience, and 
Inclination to drive him into Society, as well as fitted him with Understanding and Language to 
continue and enjoy it."). 
6. P. 49 & n.5 (citing ERNEST HEMINGWAY, A Clean, Well-Lighted Place, in THE VIKING 
PORTABLE HEMINGWAY 531 (1944)); see also EARL Rovrr & GERRY BONNER, ERNEST 
HEMINGWAY 98 (rev. ed. 1986) ("The clean, well-lighted place is the structure that man imposes 
on the chaos to wrest order and temporal regularity out of meaningless flux of sensations."). 
7. Genesis 1:1-4. 
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order on a written document presupposes a set of constitutional read-
ers who not only form a political whole but also act individually. "To 
erect a constitutional order with public writing is to ground it not only 
in political collectivity but also in individual intelligence" (p. 85). 
In Chapter Two, "Reading the Constitutional Polity," Harris ex-
plains the importance of being able to "read" the second-order polit-
ical "text" (p. 102). He expands on his claim that the first-order 
written document serves as a metaphor for the second-order constitu-
tion of the polity. Furthermore, he argues that establishing connec-
tions between a "first order of the individual as a natural, aggregatable 
being and a second order of the public as artificial orderliness and 
wholeness" (p. 95) is crucial to the ongoing vitality of the enterprise. 
The two constitutional attributes of Authority and Legibility serve as 
the necessary mediating vectors (pp. 95-96), in the same way that 
physicists speak of vector bosons mediating the fundamental forces of 
the universe among subatomic particles. Harris likens this mutually 
conforming process to establishing a Rawlsian " 'reflective equilib-
rium,' where one arrives at a sense of justice through a process in 
which our personal overarching general principles and our specific 
everyday judgments are mutually adjusted and revised to achieve a 
durable consonance or match."8 
Harris labels the first vector Authority, by which he refers to the 
"transformation of private will into public decision that can then act 
in reverse against the particularities that make it up" (p. 95). Author-
ity mediates the generality of one order with the specificity of the 
other. The second mediating vector is Legibility, referring to the read-
ability of the second-order political "text" (pp. 95-96). The second-
order rationality of the civil law must ultimately be comprehensible by 
the individual. Harris states that "the second-order rationality of 
political process must re-enter the first-order logic of mental dis-
course" (p. 88; emphasis omitted). Furthermore, the two vectors are 
not independent but reciprocal, partly because the intelligibility of the 
second-order processes legitimates political authority. 9 
Having established that the American constitutional enterprise, 
unique in its presumption of the bindingness of words, maintains its 
coherency through the vectors of Authority and Legibility, Harris 
turns to the task of outlining an interpretive methodology in Chapter 
Three, "Explaining the Constitutional Polity" (pp. 114-63). He begins 
with a rare bit of criticism. Harris surveys several pairs of labels that 
commentators frequently apply to various styles of interpretation -
strict versus liberal, active versus restrained -:-- and rejects them as 
unhelpful at best (pp. 124-31). 
8. P. 107 n.20 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 20, 21, 46 (1971)). 
9. P. 96 (referring, as an example, to Hart's "rule of recognition" in H.L.A. HART, THE 
CoNCEPT OF LAW 92-107 (1961)). 
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Then, in what comprises the centerpiece of his book, Harris con-
structs the analytic framework of an interpretive strategy. The basis of 
his model is the perpendicular mapping of two dichotomies: positiv-
ism versus structuralism and immanence versus transcendence.10 
Harris thus divides the interpretive possibilities into four quadrants. 
The first is immanent positivism, which corresponds to a reliance on 
the plain meaning of freestanding words and clauses. The second, im-
manent structuralism, focuses on the structure and internal coherence 
of the document. Third, the transcendent positivist approach looks to 
the spirit of the words, an analysis anchored in the document but pro-
jecting out of it. Finally comes transcendent structuralism, corre-
sponding to a consideration of the logic or structure of the polity 
rather than the document. 
When speaking within these modes, according to Harris, constitu-
tional interpreters do not abuse their power. Harris does not claim 
that only certain modes are legitimate, nor even that the interpretive 
styles are mutually exclusive. On the contrary, 
"[ e]ach of the four partial styles ... has great usefulness and persuasive-
ness; each should be considered in a given case to see what the resulting 
argumentative strategy would be . . . . In a simple sense, the more inter-
pretive modes that support the decision, the more solid the decision 
would be presumed to be . . . . In their method of interpretation, the 
greatest decisions would orchestrate all four partial styles and - in the 
course of this kind of comprehensive interpretation - clarify the tense 
juncture of liberalism and democracy which, as substantive political 
models oriented alternatively to individual- and collective-oriented 
rights, underlie the American constitutional enterprise. [p. 162; foot-
notes omitted] 
Harris then offers an intriguing analysis of well-known judicial opin-
ions and scholarly constitutional writing in terms of his model. 
For an example of Harris's point that a single opinion can encom-
pass all four interpretive modes, and for specific examples of each of 
the four, consider McCulloch v. Maryland. 11 Marshall makes a state-
ment indicative of the immanent positivist when he questions the wis-
dom of adopting a construction that hinders congressional action 
"unless the words imperiously require it . . . . If, indeed, such be the 
mandate of the constitution, we have only to obey .... " 12 Although 
he does not actually rely on the plain meaning of an isolated phrase to 
decide the case, Marshall concedes that that mode of interpretation is 
a powerful one. But in construing the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
he claims that the question of whether the Constitution has delegated 
a particular power to the federal or the state government depends "on 
10. Harris offers a rich, complex, and engaging graphic representation of the Interpretable 
Constitution at p. 146. 
11. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Seep. 162 & n.29. 
12. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 408. 
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a fair construction of the whole instrument,'•13 a paradigmatic imma-
nent structuralist claim. 
Marshall also relies heavily on a transcendent positivist approach 
in deriving his doctrine of implied powers. If the Constitution were 
textually complete, he reasons, it "would partake of the prolixity of a 
legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind .... Its 
nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be 
marked ... .''14 In other words, some powers that are not explicit in 
the text of the Constitution, such as the power to establish a national 
bank, should be treated as if they were specifically enumerated. Fi-
nally, Marshall employs a transcendent structuralist approach when 
he considers whether the states or the people are the true sovereigns. 
He concludes that "[t]he government of the Union ... is, emphati-
cally, and truly, a government of the people. In form and in substance 
it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be 
exercised directly on them, and for their benefit."15 In this passage, 
Marshall looks beyond the borders of the document to the second-
order political text. 
In Chapter Four, "Revising the Constitutional Polity,'• Harris con-
siders the process of amending the Constitution (pp. 164-208). Hear-
gues that the three attributes discussed so far - "first, that a . . . 
political life can be created by the deliberative imagination whose ef-
fects are authoritatively reflected in writing; second, that it can be 
modeled in a text whose design can be grasped by human understand-
ing; and third, that this very nature requires its interpretation by ... 
its authentic citizens" (p. 164) - implicate the existence of a fourth 
attribute: the possibility of revision. Being able to amend the text re-
inforces its boundedness, because to recognize that the document 
could say something different than it does is to recognize that author-
ity lies within the boundaries of the document (p. 165). Furthermore, 
the document's amendability illuminates its bindingness as well be-
cause the constitutional authors had the capacity to write differently, 
suggesting other constitutional worlds (pp. 165-66). "The constitu-
tional order can be considered ratifiable only in the context of a capac-
ity to envision (and to endorse) a fundamentally different alternative" 
(p. 166). That ours is one of many imaginable Constitutions legiti-
mates its claim of authority. Thus, both the boundedness and binding-
ness of the document rest on its amenability to revision. 
Now, having attempted to summarize some of The Interpretable 
Constitution, I should point out that it is an extremely difficult book to 
paraphrase. Perhaps the inability to be summarized is a mark of good 
13. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 406. 
14. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407. Note that in this passage Marshall explicitly 
recognizes the importance of the legibility of the constitutional enterprise. 
15. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 404-05. 
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literature. The literature that can offer its reader a personal education, 
that can move its reader to a new ethical perspective at the end of the 
work, defies paraphrasing. But apart from the general richness of the 
work, there are two specific reasons Harris is difficult to summarize. 
The first is that he rejects the notion that one can convey a complex 
idea in straightforward language such that the reader will fully under-
stand it simply by reading it once.16 "The level of language must be 
adapted to the level of theory .... I believe it is an illusion or a form of 
reverse academic snobbism to insist that abstract ideas can be coined 
in uncomplicated prose structure" (p. 36). True to his word, Harris's 
language reflects the complexity and sophistication of his theoretical 
project. He chooses each word with great care.17 So I have no doubt 
that he would object to much of my discussion of his book, thinking it 
to be quite imprecise. 
Second, The Interpretable Constitution is difficult to paraphrase in 
the same way that a poem is. How would a reader of a poem respond 
to one who demanded, "Tell me what the poem was about!"? Would 
one simply relate the "theme" of the poem? Something along the lines 
of, " 'The Road Not Taken' deals with the concept of missed opportu-
nities ... "? Or would one try to be more detailed and describe the 
poem's imagery, its meter and rhyme, its alliteration? No. One can-
not parse a poem, analyze its separate parts individually, and still re-
main true to the genre of a poem. Perhaps one can speak that way 
about a law review article or a historical biography, but not about a 
poem ("Or a Constitution!" I imagine Harris adding). 
For that reason I have quoted The Interpretable Constitution liber-
ally, hoping to convey a sense of the work through the language Harris 
employs. Like a poet, Harris says as much in the way he writes as by 
what he writes. 18 He also requires his readers to involve themselves 
with the text in much the same way as a reader of poetry. 
16. See GEORGE ORWELL, Politics and the English Language, in SHOOTING AN ELEPHANT 
AND OTHER EssAYS 84 (1950), for one proponent of such a view. 
17. For example, consider Harris's point that the American constitutional presumption that 
words can create and order a political world is "preposterous." P. 1. Harris uses preposterous 
both in its common sense of being illogical and in its more literal sense of being inverted in time 
- a Constitution coming before a government. The words astounding, surprising, or counterin-
tuitive simply would not have done. 
18. J.T. Boulton once praised Edmund Burke's writing by saying: 
[W]hat Burke "has to say is not a matter just of 'content' or narrow paraphrasable meaning, 
but is transfused by the whole texture of his writing as it constitutes an experience for the 
reader." ... [H]is exposition - the play of imaginative insights as well as the statement of 
logical argument - itself becomes "proor• in this special sense that it communicates, and 
affirms while communicating, the rich complexity of a philosophy of life; it does not merely 
demonstrate the truth of a set of propositions. 
JAMES T. BOULTON, THE LANGUAGE OF PoLmCS JN THE AGE OF WILKES AND BURKE 97-98 
(1963) (quoting JOHN HOLLOWAY, THE VICTORIAN SAGE 10-11 (1953)). Harris's book is simi-
larly "transfused by the whole texture of his writing" and consequently thwarts attempts at 
paraphrasing. 
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To carry on a theoretical discourse, I believe it is best for a reader to 
have to work actively with a text to reach an understanding and criticism 
of it, rather than for the writer to presume to make a simple transfer of a 
thing from his or her head to someone else's head. A theoretical book 
may more appropriately approximate a carefully framed seminar than a 
lecture.19 
In light of the poetic nature of the book, I have tried not to belittle the 
work by presuming to be able to summarize it all; I have instead tried 
to give a sense of Harris's general approach and to go into slightly 
more detail with respect to his model of the Interpretable 
Constitution. 
The book is refreshingly affirmative in its approach. Its project is 
to outline an interpretive methodology that supports the relationship 
between document and polity - between Constitution and constitu-
tion - that the American constitutional project envisions. He does 
not write because he believes the Supreme Court has "got it wrong" 
(p. 33). Nor does he criticize justices or scholars for relying too heav-
ily on a particular mode of interpretation such as "original intent" or 
ignoring "the plain meaning of the text." In fact, he is extraordinarily 
accommodating, delighting in the widely different approaches of con-
curring and dissenting justices. Although Harris discusses a variety of 
views of "thoughtful constitutional citizens" (p. 28), he does so to illu-
minate a particular point, not to criticize their specific theories or in-
terpretive styles. Harris has a different perspective, not on a higher or 
lower level, but one that encompasses, yet reinterprets and relocates, a 
variety of views on constitutional interpretation. 
Harris occasionally disappoints the reader by declining to expand 
on an evocative point. For example, he briefly discusses the values of 
human dignity and democracy inherent in the Constitution (pp. 97-
99). These two attributes are implicit in the Constitution because the 
writtenness of the document requires both intelligence and collectivity 
on the part of its constitutional citizens. Harris claims that these 
metaconstitutional values should therefore inform the project of inter-
preting the Constitution and are "as close as we need to get to natural 
law in A,merican constitutional interpretation" (p. 98). He quickly 
19. P. 37. Professor James B. White makes a similar statement about reading poetry: 
The meaning of a poem is not its paraphrase, but the experience of reading it - not just 
reading it once, but reading it to learn it, to master it, reading with imaginative engagement 
and readiness to learn . . • . Of course the poem may not have a simple statement at all .... 
But some summary can always be made, and you should see that there is always something 
beyond this summary, beyond the message, in the good poem, and ... that it is this which 
gives the poem value. One has not a sense of solution but the reverse, and this works as an 
invitation. 
JAMES B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 764-65 (1973). Cf. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 
Dall.) 419, 454 (1793) (Wilson, J.) ("For, in an instrument well drawn, as in a poem well com-
posed, silence is sometimes most expressive.") (speaking of the Constitution). For a discussion of 
how The Interpretable Constitution serves as an "invitation," see infra note 20 and accompanying 
text. 
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moves on, however, leaving the reader to mull over alone the idea of 
dignity and democracy forming a pseudo-natural law. 
Some will be disappointed that there is little in the way of specific 
conclusions in The Interpretable Constitution. One certainly will not 
find a statement of the "correct" interpretation of the Constitution on 
a particular substantive question such as the right to an abortion or 
how to read the Second Amendment. But that should not be viewed 
as a shortcoming of the book. Rather, it reflects the modesty of this 
first stab at the lofty and ambitious goal of developing a theory of 
constitutional interpretation from first principles. Harris's book has 
an air of humility about it, in that his goal is not to persuade others of 
the validity of his claims but to spark a dialogue along certain lines. 
He claims merely to begin the dialogue.20 Harris sees the book to be 
the first iteration of a new way of talking about the practice of consti-
tutional interpretation, so perhaps it is unfair to expect a comprehen-
sive statement of the theory, let alone the result of applying it to 
specific cases. 
How then should one judge Harris's offering? Charles Taylor sug-
gests that a theory "can shape or alter our way of carrying out [prac-
tices] by offering an interpretation of the constitutive norms."21 
"What makes a theory right," Taylor goes on to say, "is that it brings 
practice out in the clear; that its adoption makes possible what is in 
some sense a more effective practice."22 Harris himself reminds us 
that to theorize means "to see" (p. ix). It would be premature to ask 
whether Harris's theory will make the practice of interpreting the 
Constitution more effective, but one might ask how adopting his the-
ory would change the practice. 
One effect might be to moderate the polarization of much of the 
current debate over constitutional interpretation. Harris's model of an 
Interpretable Constitution can support a variety of interpretive styles 
- requires them, in fact. But more importantly, the Interpretable 
Constitution presupposes, and thus creates, a citizenry that is intelli-
gent and responsible. 
[T]he constitutional People frames its own political nature in a text, for 
the survival of its identity, and then looks to that documented image of 
itself - to recur to its original plan for public life - to determine who 
they authentically are, or aspire to be, even beyond their current state of 
constitutional realization and the imaginings of their founders. [p. xi] 
The text is therefore not some ultimate source of authority, issuing 
commands to its subjects. Rather, it demands a set of engaged readers 
20. In fact, Harris has already planned his next contribution to the dialogue he has begun: a 
second book to be entitled The Imaginable Constitution. 
21. CHARLES TAYLOR, Social Theory as Practice, in 2 PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN 
SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 91, 99 (1985). 
22. Id. at 104. 
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who, with both "deliberation and imagination" (p. 41), explain the 
Constitution so as to harmonize the document with the political text. 
To do this well, its readers must have a thorough understanding of the 
political collectivity and its institutions, a deep involvement with the 
document, and a willingness to listen to the voices of other constitu-
tional readers. Such are the people that The Interpretable Constitution 
would have us be. 
- Steven C. Coberly 
